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SEC RULES AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  SPECIALIZED 
DISCLOSURE FOR CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
VERNA KRISHNAMURTHY* 
 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules 
promulgated through amendments to the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 mandated by federal legislation serve as a means of 
reaching U.S. companies that are expanding their operations 
overseas.  These rules are conceived of as an accountability 
mechanism, wherein companies choosing to operate in 
jurisdictions with weak rules of law are required to report on 
aspects of their activities affecting human rights in those countries.  
The corporate disclosure requirements found in the SEC final rule, 
promulgated through the amendment made in the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Section 1502, is 
an example of this approach with regard to companies using 
conflict minerals.  The experience of companies subject to reporting 
requirements under Dodd-Frank Section 1502 provides important 
considerations that must be made for the proposed specialized 
disclosure requirement in the Global Online Freedom Act for ICT 
companies dealing with government surveillance and censorship 
demands abroad, going beyond the transparency that would result 
from reporting.  Although SEC specialized corporate disclosure 
requirements are an effective means of increasing transparency 
among U.S. issuers, they will not lead to long-term changes in 
industry practice if not combined with greater involvement in 
multi-stakeholder efforts, increased awareness among investors 
with leverage on company decision-making, and effective internal 
initiatives within companies themselves. 
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act amends Section 13 of the Securities and 
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Exchange Act of 1934 to authorize promulgation of rules requiring 
issuers to disclose annually information about minerals sourced 
from the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) and adjoining 
countries.1  Section 1502 outlines a reporting requirement that 
involves “a description of the measures taken by the person to 
exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of such 
minerals,”2 including a certified independent private sector audit, a 
determination of whether the minerals are “DRC Conflict Free,” 
and efforts to make the information obtained through due 
diligence available to the public.3  The law was passed in response 
to a growing movement among consumers, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (“NGOs”), and various legislators, who recognized 
the connection between the atrocities committed as part of an 
ongoing regional conflict in a number of Central African nations 
and U.S. companies producing consumer electronics sold to the 
American public.4  One of the major functions of the corporate 
disclosure requirements on conflict minerals in Section 1502 is to 
“promote transparency and consumer awareness regarding the use 
of sought-after minerals extracted in and around DRC.”5  
Accordingly, Section 1502 developed a specialized corporate 
disclosure approach designed to hold U.S. companies accountable 
for their supply chain connection to human rights abuses 
committed in the DRC and adjoining countries. 
                                                     
1  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
2  Id. 
3  Id. at 2214. 
4  See, e.g., Metals in Mobile Phones Help Finance Congo Atrocities, GLOBAL 
WITNESS (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.globalwitness.org/library/metals-mobile-
phones-help-finance-congo-atrocities (noting research revealing that armed 
groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) financed their operations 
through the minerals trade); A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals 
– Strategy Paper, THE ENOUGH PROJECT AND THE GRASSROOTS RECONCILIATION 
GROUP (Apr. 24, 2009), 
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/comprehensive-approach-conflict-
minerals-strategy-paper (highlighting the responsibility of companies that may be 
sourcing minerals from the DRC to ensure they are not fueling the region’s 
conflict); Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128, 111th Cong. § 2(10) (2009–2010) 
(acknowledging that “[m]ineral derivatives from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo are used in industrial and technology products worldwide, including 
mobile telephones, laptop computers, and digital video recorders.”). 
5  Emily Veale, Is There Blood on Your Hands-Free Device?: Examining Legislative 
Approaches to the Conflict Minerals Problem in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 21 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 503, 522 (2013) [hereinafter Veale, Is There Blood on 
Your Hands-Free Device?]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/5
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The SEC’s final rule on corporate disclosure relating to conflict 
minerals was passed in August 2012.6  The final rule applies to any 
company required to file reports with the SEC under the Exchange 
Act of 1934 who use the minerals tin, tantalum, tungsten, or gold 
where these are “‘necessary to the functionality or production’ of a 
product manufactured or contracted to be manufactured by th[at] 
company.”7   As a first step, countries using any of the designated 
minerals must conduct a reasonable “country of origin” inquiry.8  
If the company knows or has reason to believe the minerals come 
from the DRC region based on their inquiry, it must conduct due 
diligence on its supply chain and file a Conflict Minerals Report to 
make a determination regarding whether the minerals are “DRC 
Conflict Free” or “Not Been Found to Be ‘DRC Conflict Free.’”9  
Due diligence must conform to a nationally or internationally 
recognized due diligence framework and is subject to an 
independent private sector audit and certification requirement.10  
The final rule also allows a two-year phase-in period for large 
companies (four years for smaller reporting companies) to adjust to 
the disclosure requirements, during which a company that is 
unable to determine the origin of its minerals from due diligence 
can designate those minerals as “DRC Conflict Undeterminable” in 
their Conflict Minerals Report.11  All reporting under the SEC final 
rule must be made publicly available on each company’s website, 
whether or not the minerals are determined to be “DRC Conflict 
Free.”12 
The required corporate disclosure on conflict minerals is 
significant because it attempts to hold accountable those 
companies that may be complicit in human rights abuses 
committed by foreign governments.  The SEC determined that the 
reporting requirement would help investors price securities of 
relevant companies based on the reported information and would 
generally increase transparency and informational efficiency in the 
                                                     
6  See generally Conflict Minerals, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 
34-67716, 2012 WL 3611799 (Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Conflict Minerals Release]. 
7  Fact Sheet: Disclosing the Use of Conflict Minerals, SEC.GOV, 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171562058#.UqIwARbv
yu5 [hereinafter SEC Fact Sheet].  
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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market.13  However, there have been a number of criticisms against 
using an SEC rule as an accountability mechanism within the 
international human rights context.  Two major problems with the 
SEC rule promulgated under Dodd-Frank Section 1502 are that the 
rule does not fall within the typical corporate decision making 
framework and that it has not produced any results in changing 
industry practice because of delays in implementation. 
The SEC rule on conflict minerals, as mentioned previously, is 
not like other typical reporting requirements because it does not 
directly serve the main corporate interest of profit maximization 
and shareholder benefit.  The SEC is required to consider whether 
the rules they promulgate will “promote efficiency, competition, 
and capital formation.”14  This duty resonates with the traditional 
and principal end goals of corporate decision making to maximize 
profit and value for shareholders of the company.15  Human rights 
abuses committed in the DRC and adjoining countries are, 
arguably, not directly relevant to a corporation’s profits or 
shareholder benefit.  In fact, opponents commenting on the 
proposed conflict minerals rule argued that the Conflict Minerals 
Report required would include information outside the scope of 
what is considered material to investors.16 
In response to legal challenges mounted by the Chamber of 
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the 
Business Roundtable, the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility (“ICCR”) reinforced its view that the SEC conflict 
minerals reporting requirement is based on concerns that are 
integral to investor materiality.17  In comments made to the 
                                                     
13  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-cv-635 (RLW), 2013 WL 4010670 
(D.D.C. 2013) (citing 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,350).  
14  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(f), 48 Stat. 881 (current version at 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(f) 2012). 
15  See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970 (“’[T]here is one and only one social 
responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed 
to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to 
say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.’”).  Id. 
(quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962)). 
16  See, e.g., Conflict Minerals, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 
34-63547, 2011 WL 840408 (Mar. 1, 2011) (asserting that the purpose of the 
disclosure called for in the proposed rule is “fundamentally different” from the 
purposes of rules typically promulgated within the Securities Exchange Act 
reporting system). 
17  See Investor Statement in Support of SEC Rule 1502 on Conflict Minerals, 
SOURCING NETWORK (June 3, 2013), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/5
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proposed rule and submitted to the SEC, the ICCR and the Social 
Investment Forum (“SIF”) asserted that proper disclosure in 
reporting will allow socially responsible investors to better “assess 
social (i.e. human rights) and reputational risks . . . associated with 
sourcing from the Democratic Republic of Congo.”18  The 
organizations further stated that the materiality argument was 
particularly compelling, considering that Socially Responsible 
Investment (“SRI”) assets had grown significantly in recent years 
to represent a large population of investors who would deem an 
electronics company’s potential ties to human rights abuses in 
DRC relevant to their investment decisions.19 
The administrative response to similar arguments made by 
industry actors is consistent with that of SRI associations.  The SEC 
posited that the cost of compliance, though significant, may be 
partly offset by “’increased demand’” for conflict-free products 
and “’shares by socially responsible consumers and investors.’”20  
Through their materiality arguments, government and investor 
supporters of specialized corporate disclosure for conflict minerals 
have indicated that the information obtained through due 
diligence and reported and published by companies is material for 
investors for whom social and reputational issues are relevant 
considerations in making investment decisions.  In the context of 
conflict minerals, however, the industry backlash to the reporting 
requirements alone evince the notion that, for corporate actors, 
                                                     
http://www.sourcingnetwork.org/storage/minerals-investors-
group/CM%20Investor%20Statement%202013-05-28%20FIN.pdf (opposing the 
lawsuit filed against the SEC and challenging the final rule on conflict minerals on 
behalf of investment groups representing over $450 billion of assets under 
management).  
18  See Comments Regarding File Number S7-40-10 on Conflict Minerals 
Disclosure, Letter from Lauren Compere et al., Managing Director, Boston 
Common Asset Management, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
Sec’y (Mar. 2, 2011) (arguing that conflict minerals disclosure provides material 
information to investors and will improve market efficiency), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-158.pdf [hereinafter Letter from 
SIF and ICCR]; see also REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE 
WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 176 (2012) [hereinafter CONSENT OF 
THE NETWORKED] (“By 2010 the amount of assets held by US investors in some 
form of socially responsible investment funds . . . had reached $3.07 trillion out of 
a total of $25.2 trillion in the US investment marketplace.”). 
19  See Letter from SIF and ICCR, supra note 18 (noting that SRI assets were up 
by 34% since 2005). 
20  See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-cv-635 (RLW), 2013 WL 4010670 
(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting the SEC in 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,350).  
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humanitarian concerns in the DRC are not enough incentive on 
their face to expend the time and resources necessary to comply 
with the final rule.  Furthermore, the mere fact that so many 
industry actors have challenged the rule on these grounds shows 
that companies are not yet faced with enough push for policy 
change on the investor level to make efforts to change their supply 
chain practices on their own.  Therefore, the arguably expansive 
reporting requirements promulgated under Dodd-Frank Section 
1502 conflict with the traditional calculus of corporate decision 
makers, which is based primarily on profit maximization rather 
than social concerns.  
The second major failure of the SEC final rule for corporate 
disclosure on conflict minerals is its time delay and resulting 
ineffectiveness in effecting industry-level change.  A significant 
amount of time stood between the passage of Dodd-Frank and the 
promulgation of the corresponding SEC final rule.21  This is 
important to note because Dodd-Frank’s Section 1502 amendment 
to the Securities and Exchange Act mandated that the final rule be 
set forth by the SEC no later than nine months after Dodd-Frank’s 
passage, which would have been April 2011.22  The SEC released a 
proposed rule in December 2010, and allowed a period for 
comments on the proposed rule until January 31, 2011.23  This 
comment period was then extended to March 2, 2011, so that the 
SEC could collect further information.24  The final rule was not 
released until August 22, 2012, more than two years after the 
passage of Dodd-Frank Section 1502.25  Companies were not 
required to submit reports pursuant to the final rule until May 31, 
2014.26  However, due to pending litigation on the final rule in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the SEC issued a 
statement moving the deadline for reporting to June 2, 2014, 
                                                     
21 Compare Dodd–Frank, supra note 1, with Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 
249b (2012) (effective on Nov. 13, 2012). 
22  See Veale, supra note 5, at 524 (“Dodd-Frank’s amendment of the Exchange 
Act requires that the SEC issue final rules implementing the statutory 
requirements no later than nine months after the date of enactment, or April 
2011.”).  
23  Id. 
24  Id. at 524–25 n.164 (citing Conflict Minerals, Extension of Comment Period, 
76 Fed. Reg. 6110 (Feb. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-63793fr.pdf). 
25  See generally Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, supra note 21.  
26  Veale, supra note 5, at 525. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/5
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awaiting a decision from the Court.27  While the reporting 
requirement was upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court, many 
companies will be able to take advantage of the aforementioned 
phase-in period whereby companies can deem their products as 
“DRC Conflict Undeterminable” in their Conflict Minerals Report 
if they are unable to determine the origin of their minerals 
definitively through their due diligence methods.28  This phase-in 
period is two years for larger reporting companies, and four years 
for smaller reporting companies.29 
The breakdown of the procedure through which Section 1502 
was implemented represents the procedural drawback of 
attempting to hold companies accountable for their use of conflict 
minerals through specialized corporate disclosure requirements.  
The implication of the above timeframe is that for many 
companies, a final determination on the status of an issuer’s 
mineral use is not required until 2018.  This means that effective 
transparency on conflict minerals use will not be achieved until 
almost a decade after the requirement was conceived in Section 
1502.  The long and drawn-out process of achieving effective 
transparency through SEC corporate disclosure requirements has a 
particularly unfortunate impact in the human rights context 
because of the on-the-ground effect.  An issuer subject to reporting 
requirements may be unknowingly participating in the sale of 
conflict minerals and funding of armed groups in the DRC and 
adjoining countries up to the point at which they obtain adequate 
information on their supply chain.  For a conflict that has killed 
approximately 5.4 million people since 1996, procedural lags could 
translate into hundreds of thousands more lives lost.30  The use of 
specialized corporate disclosure to hold U.S. companies 
accountable for their potential complicity in human rights abuses 
committed in the DRC and adjoining companies will thus take a 
greater amount of time to produce real results than other potential 
accountability routes. 
                                                     
27  Cory Hester, SEC Commissioners Issue Joint Statement on Status of Conflict 
Minerals Rules, WESTLAW CAPITAL MARKETS DAILY BRIEFING, 2014 WL 1672573 (Apr. 
29, 2014). 
28  SEC Fact Sheet, supra note 7.  
29  Id. 
30  See Eastern Congo, ENOUGH PROJECT, 
http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/eastern_congo (last visited Jan. 28, 
2015) (“Since 1996 the International Rescue Committee has calculated that 
approximately 5.4 million people have died from war-related causes.”). 
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The Global Online Freedom Act (“GOFA”) is a more recent 
effort to address corporate accountability for human rights issues 
overseas, targeting companies within the ICT sector operating in 
countries with restrictions on their citizens’ use of the Internet.  
GOFA was first introduced in Congress in 2006, in response to a 
disclosure of information by Yahoo! in China that led to the 
imprisonment of Chinese dissidents by the Chinese government.31  
It was thus passed to address those U.S. companies who “for the 
sake of market share and profits . . . have compromised both the 
integrity of their product and their duties as responsible corporate 
citizens” by providing information to sovereign governments that 
are used to enforce questionable human rights practices with 
regard to freedom of expression and privacy.32 
The SEC rule envisioned by GOFA is similar to the rule 
pursuant to Dodd-Frank Section 1502 because it aims to hold 
corporate entities operating within restrictive human rights 
environments accountable through a human rights due diligence 
requirement to produce greater transparency.  Section 201 of the 
latest version of the Global Online Freedom Act proposes an 
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to create a rule 
requiring companies operating in State Department-designated 
“Internet-restricting countries” to include in their annual report 
“[c]ompany policies applicable to the company’s internal 
operations that address human rights due diligence through a 
statement of policy . . . .”33  This policy must outline clear 
expectations for all parties under the company’s control operating 
in relevant countries.34  The policy and corresponding human 
rights due diligence must also be made publicly available and 
adequately communicated, and must be “independently assessed 
by a third party to demonstrate compliance in practice . . . .”35  
Companies who participate in good standing with a multi-
stakeholder initiative that requires its corporate members to 
undergo independent third party assessments are exempted from 
                                                     
31  See Ian Brown, The Global Online Freedom Act, 14 GEO. J. OF INT’L. AFF. 153, 
154 (2013) (discussing the evolution of the Global Online Freedom Act). 
32  See id. at 155 (quoting GOFA sponsor Representative Christopher Smith’s 
remarks on the proposed legislation). 
33  H.R. 491, 113th  Cong. § 201 (1st Sess. 2013). 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/5
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the reporting requirement.36 
The SEC rule proposed by GOFA, like the conflict minerals 
rule, requires that due diligence conforms to an internationally 
recognized framework and is assessed through an independent 
third party audit for compliance.  GOFA requires that the 
statement of policy addressing the company’s human rights due 
diligence must be “consistent with applicable provisions of the 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises issued by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development . . . .”37  
In the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) provides 
general guidelines for companies operating in multiple 
jurisdictions on operating their business in a manner consistent 
with internationally recognized standards.38  Some relevant 
provisions within the Guidelines are those that obligate companies 
to “[s]eek ways to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights 
impacts that are directly linked to their business operations” and 
“[c]arry out human rights due diligence as appropriate to their 
size, the nature and context of operations and the severity of the 
risks of adverse human rights impacts.”39  The OECD Guidelines 
are currently the only such government-approved code of conduct 
on the international level.40  Through these provisions, the OECD 
Guidelines are a means of providing ICT companies with some 
guidance on conducting human rights due diligence and 
formulating policies for their operations as required by the 
proposed GOFA rule.  However, the provisions are very broad and 
simply cover human rights due diligence in general.  Notably, the 
Guidelines make no mention of due diligence mechanisms or 
policies that are specific to the cross-section between freedom of 
expression and companies operating within restrictive regimes.41  
                                                     
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 31 (2011) [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES] (providing 
background on the history and purpose of the Guidelines). 
39  Id at 31.  
40  Id. at 3.  
41  See Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8 (2011) 
(“Corporate responsibility codes such as the United Nations Global Compact and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises rarely mention free speech outside a 
general call for corporations to respect human rights.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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Much like the use of the OECD Guidelines guides company 
policymaking, the requirement for an independent third-party 
assessment for compliance invokes the involvement of outside 
actors in helping change policy and practice in the ICT sector with 
regard to human rights.  GOFA specifically references the expertise 
of multi-stakeholder initiatives that promote “the rule of law and 
the adoption of laws, policies, and practices that protect, respect, 
and fulfill freedom of expression and privacy.”42  GOFA defers to 
multi-stakeholder initiatives to provide specific guidelines for 
conducting human rights due diligence and shaping policies to 
deal with freedom of expression and privacy issues, as evidenced 
by its safe harbor provision, exempting companies who participate 
in these initiatives from the reporting requirements under the SEC 
rule.43  The Global Network Initiative (“GNI”) is referenced by 
name in GOFA as a multi-stakeholder initiative, providing 
guidance to companies for developing adequate strategies to 
address human rights in Internet-restricting countries.44 
For its part, the GNI requires all of its members to conduct 
human rights impact assessments to obtain information on 
potential freedom of expression and privacy risks to users.45  The 
human rights impact assessments would be conducted each time a 
company reviews and revises its procedures for dealing with 
government requests for user information; enters a new market; 
evaluates potential partners, investments and suppliers; or 
develops new technologies, products, and services.46  The GNI’s 
Implementation Guidelines outline the methods that should be 
used for human rights assessments focused on threats to freedom 
of expression and privacy, including one that the actors’ companies 
should consult with and prioritize their use of assessments.47  The 
GNI also requires its company participants to undergo an 
                                                     
42  H.R. 491, 113th Cong. § 201, at 21 (1st Sess. 2013). 
43  See id. (“An Internet communications service company that operates in an 
Internet-restricting country shall not be required to include the annual report of 
the company information described in paragraph (1) if the company includes in 
the annual report of the company [proof of participation in a multi-stakeholder 
initiative”).  
      44    Id.  
45  Global Network Initiative, Implementation Guidelines for the Principles on 
Freedom of Expression and Privacy, at 2, 
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/5
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independent third-party assessment of the type of method 
required under the proposed reporting requirement, which would 
supervise the work of an independent assessor who is selected by 
the company from a pool of assessors approved by the GNI 
board.48  While multi-stakeholder initiatives, like the GNI, are more 
constructive than the OECD Guidelines in providing a framework 
for companies falling under the reporting requirements in GOFA 
Section 201,49 these initiatives are completely voluntary and 
private, and thus, do not carry the same weight as do legal 
obligations for companies.50 
The reporting requirements envisioned in GOFA present some 
of the same challenges as those contained in Dodd-Frank Section 
1502, highlighting major gaps in using specialized corporate 
disclosure as a means of addressing human rights issues faced by 
U.S. issuers overseas.51  The first of these gaps is that transparency 
is only the first step in a much larger process needed to hold 
companies accountable and change corporate practice with regard 
to human rights abuses committed within foreign jurisdictions.  
The end result of specialized corporate disclosure requirements 
under Dodd-Frank and GOFA would be greater availability of 
information about company practices that might otherwise be 
difficult for consumers and investors to obtain.  Legislation 
requiring corporate disclosure on human rights issues is supported 
by the belief that one way to change company policies is to 
encourage transparency and to encourage invested actors to 
develop campaigns to bring the human rights issues to public 
attention, to the point where companies are incentivized to change 
their policies and practices.52  However, the mere availability of 
information will not change a company’s decision-making 
practices or policy, unless the information is harnessed as part of a 
larger movement.  Without activist efforts to seek out information 
                                                     
48  See Global Network Initiative, Governance, Accountability and Learning 
Framework, 
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/governanceframework/index.php (outlining 
the responsibilities of the Board and participating companies in regards to the 
independent assessment process). 
      49    OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at Sec. 201. 
50  See Chander, supra note 41, at 38 (“[T]he private initiative lacks the legal 
sanctions available to enforce a statutory obligation.”). 
       51    Dodd–Frank Act, supra note 1. 
52  Telephone Interview with Michael Samway, Adjunct Assistant Professor, 
Georgetown University (Nov. 8, 2013). 
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reported pursuant to SEC rules and published on a company’s 
website, along with the use of this information as part of a 
concerted effort to change industry practice, transparency itself 
will not hold companies accountable. 
The SEC rule outlined in GOFA arguably addresses the 
transparency conundrum more effectively than Dodd-Frank 
Section 1502.  The final rule on conflict minerals requires only that 
relevant companies conduct due diligence on their supply chain 
and publish a determination on the origin of their minerals based 
on this method.53  As a result, although the rule requires an 
approved process for compliance by the company to obtain and 
publish information on its supply chain, it leaves it up to 
consumers and investors to use this information to lobby the 
industry to change its sourcing practices.  It is perhaps for this 
reason that so many NGOs and investor groups have published 
information on how and why their consumers and investors can 
use this information and their leverage to give companies a reason 
to change their practices.54  The GOFA rule, on the other hand, 
contains elements that attempt to bridge the gap between 
transparency and changes in industry practice.  Section 201 not 
only requires companies to report due diligence methods but also 
develop and report company policies that outline expectations for 
employees, as communicated to business partners and “reflected in 
operational policies and procedures necessary to embed it 
throughout the company.”55  This additional component in the 
proposed reporting requirement in GOFA obligates companies to 
operationalize their due diligence by setting forth a corresponding 
                                                     
53  See SEC Fact Sheet, supra note 7 (stating that the final steps in reporting 
under the SEC final rule on conflict minerals are the due diligence determination 
and the independent private sector audit). 
54  See, e.g., Sasha Lezhnev and Alexandra Hellmuth, Taking Conflict Out of 
Consumer Gadgets: Company Rankings on Conflict Minerals 2012, ENOUGH PROJECT, 
Aug. 2012, at 2, 8 (including a ranking of major efforts of major electronics 
companies in tracing their supply chains and calling on consumers to ask 
“companies to publish company policies on this issue, join industry and 
multistakeholder groups . . . and invest in cleanly sourced minerals from the 
region that benefit local communities.”); see also Conflict Minerals Program 
Overview, RESPONSIBLE SOURCING NETWORK, 
http://www.sourcingnetwork.org/minerals/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2015) 
(including a list of common products that may contain conflict minerals and 
encouraging investors to research company policies on conflict minerals and 
check proxy statements for resolutions on risk analysis or policies to clean up 
supply chains).  
55  H.R. 491, 113th Cong. § 201, at 19 (1st Sess. 2013). 
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change in company policy.  GOFA, thereby, addresses the 
problematic sole requirement of transparency by at least requiring 
companies to take the next step needed to change their practices. 
The second gap in specialized disclosure to address corporate 
complicity in human rights abuses is the danger of “naming and 
shaming” with regard to information published on company 
websites, as mandated by both the final rule on conflict minerals 
and the GOFA requirement.56  The threat of naming and shaming, 
which is typically done largely through the work of NGOs, is 
meant to raise awareness on human rights issues, as well as to 
draw attention to those corporate actors that these NGOs believe 
are not making an adequate effort to address such issues in their 
operations.57  Naming and shaming, when done properly, is 
effective in bringing international human rights issues to the 
public’s attention because it allows advocacy groups to create 
something that resonates with the broader public and connects the 
individual to the human rights issue by way of a product or service 
provided by a brand she recognizes.58  Naming and shaming is, 
oftentimes, the only effective way of bringing about change in 
company practice because companies avoid complicity with 
human rights abuses to prevent reputational damage.  However, 
the naming and shaming approach also lends itself to the danger of 
antagonizing companies into creating short-term, media-driven 
solutions, instead of incentivizing companies to affect long-term 
policy changes.  This approach could potentially run against the 
stated goals of reporting requirements in GOFA and Dodd-Frank 
to incentivize the relevant industries to provide products and 
services that consumers can trust.  In situations where it is possible 
for a company to engage with a foreign market while complying 
with human rights standards at home in the United States, the 
naming and shaming approach could cause a company to 
disengage instead of cleaning up its practices.     
Naming and shaming was effective in shaping the industry’s 
                                                     
      56  See, e.g., H.R. 491, 113th Cong. §201, at 17–18, 21 (1st Sess. 2013) (requiring 
companies to include detailed information regarding their human rights due 
diligence on their public company websites). 
57  See Veale, Is There Blood on Your Hands-Free Device?, supra note 5, at 532 
(explaining the role and techniques used by NGOs for corporate accountability on 
conflict minerals). 
58 See Telephone Interview with Michael Samway, Adjunct Assistant 
Professor, Georgetown University (Nov. 8, 2013) (discussing effective practices in 
working to change company policies). 
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positive response to tackling conflict minerals in supply chains.  In 
2009, Thaisarco Smelting and Refining Co. was referenced in a 
report by the NGO Global Witness as a company “involved in the 
trade in minerals from eastern DRC” and was thus publicly 
implicated in helping to fund the regional conflict.59  Thaisarco 
suspended all purchases of tin ore from the DRC, partially in 
response to Global Witness’s report.60  This decision was made in 
spite of the fact that Thaisarco had already been in the process of 
developing a certification scheme to clean up its supply chain at 
the time the Global Witness report was released.61  In announcing 
its decision, Thaisarco stated that “’although [it was] acting entirely 
lawfully, the threat of misleading and bad publicity remain[ed] for 
anyone who participate[d] in DRC tin trade.’”62  Had Thaisarco 
continued with its efforts to create a viable certification scheme, it 
might have been able to pursue profit opportunities in the DRC 
while also cleaning up its supply chain and strengthening its 
commitment to human rights in the region.  This scenario 
represents the aforementioned situation where the company can 
engage with the foreign market while complying with human 
rights standards at home.  Antagonizing a company into 
eliminating their profit opportunities to avoid being shamed 
publicly through the use of reported information will not 
encourage companies to develop policies that reflect greater 
respect for human rights.  Instead, such antagonizing could cause 
companies to exit the foreign market completely. 
Although naming and shaming was a corporate concern even 
before Dodd-Frank Section 1502 came into play, it was clearly a 
relevant concern for companies during the drafting and formation 
of the final rule.  A number of companies submitting comments to 
the proposed rule objected to the broad classification of cassiterite, 
wolframite, gold and tantalum as “conflict minerals” without 
distinguishing those that did not contribute to human rights 
abuses in DRC.63  One industry commentator argued that such a 
                                                     
59  GLOBAL WITNESS, COMPANIES INVOLVED IN THE TRADE IN MINERALS FROM 
EASTERN DRC 1 (2009).  
60  Veale, Is There Blood on Your Hands-Free Device?, supra note 5, at 533. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. (citing Joe Bavier, Thaisarco Suspends Congo Tin Ore Purchases, REUTERS 
(Sept. 18, 2009), available at http:// 
af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE58H09S20090918). 
63  See Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 6, at 16 (noting that a number of 
corporate commentators to the proposed SEC rule believed that a blanket 
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classification would impose “’a reputational taint on these entire 
industries’ and ’makes it highly challenging for companies in these 
industries to communicate effectively with investors and the 
public.’”64  A similar objection was made to the provision in the 
proposed rule requiring companies to characterize their products 
as “not having been found to be ‘DRC conflict free.’”65  In National 
Association of Manufacturers, et al. v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Plaintiffs argued that “[t]he compelled disclosure is 
intended to serve as a ‘scarlet letter.’”66  These challenges by 
industry actors demonstrate a concern among companies that the 
naming and shaming that may result from the information 
required to be disclosed in the SEC rule may lead to a misinformed 
and unnecessarily negative perception of the company.  Where a 
company has made active efforts to clean up its supply chain and 
has the potential to engage in the market without contributing to 
human rights abuses, it should be encouraged to continue its 
efforts to implement changes in its policy.  In this sense, a naming 
and shaming strategy that causes companies to withdraw from the 
market for fear of reputational damage instead of changing long-
term company practice is counterproductive. 
The fear of public naming and shaming exists in the realm of 
ICT companies operating in Internet-restricting regimes as well.  
The public shaming of Yahoo! after it provided information to the 
Chinese government, which led to the arrest of dissident journalist 
Shi Tao, sparked a general call to evaluate the practices of Internet 
service providers working in restrictive markets.67  Responding to 
public attention drawn by the incident, Yahoo! made an explicit 
commitment to the human rights of its users around the world 
through collective action, compliance practices, information 
restrictions, and government engagement.68  Although Yahoo! did 
                                                     
classification of the four minerals as “conflict minerals” would unfairly stigmatize 
the entire industry). 
64  See id. (quoting Niotan II’s letter regarding the proposed rule). 
65  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-cv-635 (RLW), 2013 WL 4010670 
(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Plaintiff’s brief) (internal quotations omitted). 
66  Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s brief) (internal quotations omitted). 
67  See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “RACE TO THE BOTTOM”: CORPORATE 
COMPLICITY IN CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP (2006), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/china0806webwcover.pdf. 
68  See id. at Appendix VII: Liu Xiaobo’s Letter to Yahoo!, at 114, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/15.htm#_Toc142395845 
(outlining Yahoo!’s commitment made to U.S. Congress in February 2006 
following the Shi Tao hearings in regard to freedom of expression and privacy in 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
KRISHNAMURTHY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015  5:06 PM 
836 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:3 
make a number of efforts to deliver on its commitment to promote 
human rights in Internet-restricting countries, it quickly 
transformed aspects of its operations in China, culminating with its 
handing over business operations serving the Chinese market to 
the Chinese company Alibaba.69  This response is similar to the 
approach taken by the aforementioned Thaisarco and Global 
Witness, where the company responded defensively to public 
naming and shaming by withdrawing from markets that drew risk 
and negative attention to its brand.  Although in the Yahoo! case, 
unlike that of Thaisarco, there may not have been any way to 
engage in the market without contributing to human rights abuses, 
in both cases the citizens of foreign countries continued to be 
subject to these abuses. 
If specialized corporate disclosure is meant to change company 
policies in the long-term and facilitate the creation of effective 
industry-wide practice in dealing with human rights issues, it must 
not use an approach that antagonizes companies into pulling out of 
the markets in question to avoid addressing these issues.  
Withdrawal from these markets could create a vacuum to be filled 
by corporations of other nations that do not have the accountability 
measures used to restrict U.S. companies.70  In those circumstances 
where it is possible for the U.S. company to implement policies, or 
at least make an effort to change policies in the long-term that 
would allow them to continue to engage with the foreign market 
while also upholding high human rights standards, they should be 
encouraged to do so.  As stated in a critique of GOFA’s ultimate 
effects in China, “U.S. legislators may want to consider whether it 
is better to have U.S. or Russian, Indian, North Korean, and 
Japanese IT companies enabling Beijing’s Internet restriction.”71  
                                                     
China). 
69  See Catherine Shu, Yahoo China Shuts Down Its Web Portal, TECHCRUNCH 
(Sept. 1, 2013), available at http://techcrunch.com/2013/09/01/yahoo-china-
shuts-down-its-web-portal/ (discussing the process by which Yahoo operations in 
China were taken over and eventually phased out by Alibaba Group); see also Our 
Work: Shi Tao, AMNESTY INT’L, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-
work/cases/china-shi-tao (arguing that Yahoo did little to “send a clear message 
to Chinese authorities that censorship would not be tolerated” before ending its 
operations in China).  
70  See Chander, Googling Freedom, supra note 41, at 37 (“[If] U.S. corporations 
do choose to abandon repressive states, this abandonment will leave a hole for 
other companies, both indigenous and foreign, to fill; such companies may evince 
less concern for human rights than their departing U.S. competitors.”). 
71  William J. Cannici, Jr., The Global Online Freedom Act: A Critique of Its 
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Although an approach favoring engagement where possible is not 
one that is universally supported, it is worth considering where 
such engagement would potentially be mutually beneficial to the 
company and the citizens within the jurisdiction of the markets 
served. 
Finally, the third gap that is evinced by the experience of 
Dodd-Frank’s specialized disclosure and that which is called for in 
GOFA is that the prevailing view of corporate decision-making is 
still meant to serve profit maximization and shareholder benefit.  
Many state corporate statutes provide corporate managers a level 
of discretion in decision making, allowing them to take into 
account ethical and community-related considerations, even where 
the decision may not directly benefit shareholders and promote 
corporate profit.72  However, as stated by Anupam Chander, legal 
scholar on globalization and technology, “many academics and 
courts would still encourage or require managers to justify these 
extra-shareholder considerations as redounding ultimately to 
benefit the shareholder’s pocketbook.”73  Thus, although human 
rights considerations may be part of the calculus for companies 
operating overseas, current corporate governance of U.S. 
companies indicates that profit-making objectives are still the 
driving force behind corporate decision-making. 
As delineated previously, Dodd-Frank Section 1502 was 
challenged on numerous grounds related to its alleged irrelevance 
to shareholder interests.  In response to challenges mounted 
against the SEC final rule by industry actors, the SEC has 
responded that although compliance with the rule might come at a 
cost borne by shareholders and could negatively impact allocative 
efficiency, indirect benefits would be received in the form of 
greater investment by socially conscious investors and 
consumers.74  The envisioned increase in demand would be based 
                                                     
Objectives, Methods, and Ultimate Effectiveness Combating American Businesses that 
Facilitate Internet Censorship in the People’s Republic of China, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J 
123, 144 (2007). 
72  See AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 2.01(b) (1994) 
(“Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the 
corporation, in the conduct of its business . . . [m]ay take into account ethical 
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible 
conduct of the business”). 
73 Chander, Googling Freedom, supra note 49, at 22.  
74  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-cv-635 (RLW), 2013 WL 4010670, at 21 
n.14 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,350). 
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on the idea that investors would not want to invest in companies 
that cannot disclose their minerals to be “DRC Conflict Free” 
because of reputational risk realized by the publishing of such 
information.  David M. Lynn, former Chief Counsel of the Division 
of Corporation Finance at the SEC, opined that “this seems to be a 
circular argument given that, for the most part, the issuer would 
not have been required to perform due diligence on the supply 
chain and provide any disclosure regarding the use of conflict 
minerals absent Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act.”75  
Additionally, the percentage of investors and consumers that use 
their leverage for socially responsible investment decisions 
regarding conflict minerals is not yet significant enough to effect 
large-scale change in corporate policies.  
Although similar arguments have been made by opponents of 
the reporting requirements set forth in GOFA, human rights issues 
faced by ICT companies are more relevant to shareholder value 
and traditional economic concerns than those faced by companies 
using conflict minerals.  This is because there are fewer degrees of 
separation between investors and consumers and the human rights 
abuses committed by foreign governments, making ICT company 
policy with regard to human rights a more relevant consideration.  
The victims of human rights abuses in the DRC are less directly 
related to the supply chain or consumer base of U.S. companies 
selling products containing conflict minerals.  In contrast, a victim 
whose data is provided to a repressive government by their 
Internet service provider is the consumer himself.  This distinction, 
where the consumer may “stand as the unwilling victim of a tort 
rather than the beneficiary of a freely made contract[,]” has led to 
the argument that “unadulterated profit maximization – including 
acting in a manner indifferent to the political freedoms of one’s 
patrons – becomes unethical.”76  Therefore, the traditional 
argument that SEC specialized corporate disclosure related to 
human rights concerns is beyond the scope of the SEC’s traditional 
rulemaking authority may not carry as much weight in the 
freedom of expression and privacy context. 
The particular impact of corporate operations on human rights 
                                                     
75  David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using 
the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 336 (2011).  
76  Chander, supra note 41, at 25 (exploring the arguments of the “Global 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization” view of the social responsibility of 
corporations).  
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abuses thus appears to be more direct with Internet privacy than 
the sale of conflict minerals, supporting the need for a corporate 
accountability mechanism for ICT companies operating in 
restrictive regimes.  However, many important players argue that 
an SEC rule is not the best means of achieving corporate 
accountability in the Internet privacy realm, as it might have been 
for conflict minerals.  These actors argue that SEC rules should not 
be incorporated into GOFA because the SEC is already 
overburdened and should not be dealt yet another challenge in 
determining the materiality for investors of online privacy issues.77  
Although experts such as Bennett Freeman, of SRI mutual fund 
company Calvert Investments, believe that a materiality argument 
exists for investors with regard to Internet privacy, they believe 
that GOFA is much less likely to become law with the SEC 
reporting requirement because of the burden on the SEC.78  In 
October 2013, Mary Jo White, Chairman of the SEC, addressed the 
issue in discussing the future of corporate disclosure requirements 
in a speech at the 2013 Leadership Conference for the National 
Association of Corporate Directors.79  In her speech, the Chairman 
identified the danger of “information overload” to investors that 
may occur where too much required disclosure could make it very 
difficult for investors to sort through the information to determine 
what is relevant to their decision-making.80  Many actors involved 
in the development of corporate accountability mechanisms for 
ICT companies took this as an indication that SRIs and NGOs 
should choose their battles carefully when it comes to supporting 
the promulgation of further SEC rules.81  Although this paper does 
not delve into the merits of the various other options for corporate 
accountability aside from specialized corporate disclosure, it 
should be noted that this position does exist and helps validate the 
concern that passage of the corporate disclosure required by 
                                                     
77  Telephone Interview with Bennett Freeman, Senior Vice President for 
Sustainability Research and Policy, Calvert Investments (Nov. 21, 2013). 
78  Id. 
79  See generally Mary Jo White, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at 
the National Association of Corporate Directors – Leadership Conference 2013: 
The Path Forward on Disclosure (Oct. 15, 2013),  
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539878806#.UscKJBaTPj
A. 
80  Id. (discussing the concern for the disproportionate number of SEC 
disclosure requirements leading to an “’information overload’”).   
81  Telephone Interview with Bennett Freeman, supra note 77. 
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proposed GOFA rule may, like the Dodd-Frank rule, be a 
challenging and unlikely possibility. 
The experience of Dodd-Frank Section 1502 and the current 
pitfalls in using specialized corporate disclosure to hold companies 
accountable for human rights abuses under foreign governments 
teaches us a number of lessons about the efforts needed to make 
the proposed GOFA disclosure requirements effective.  In general, 
there must be a more integrated approach to conducting due 
diligence and using the obtained information to affect change in 
practices industry wide.  Accordingly, a greater number of major 
companies, relevant NGOs, investors, governments and other 
industry actors should become involved in multi-stakeholder 
initiatives to forge a more cooperative approach to complying with 
the standards set forth by reporting requirements.  Legislators and 
other administrators involved in the implementation of both 
Dodd-Frank Section 1502 and, potentially, GOFA Section 201 
recognize the utility of an established and uniform framework to 
guide due diligence expectations.82  In issuing its final rule on 
conflict minerals, the SEC stated they were persuaded by the 
commentators that using “a nationally or internationally 
recognized due diligence framework . . . will enhance the quality of 
an issuer’s due diligence, promote comparability of the Conflict 
Minerals Reports of different issuers, and provide a framework by 
which auditors can assess an issuer’s due diligence.”83  The 
growing support by lawmakers for a designated due diligence 
framework is evidenced by the Safe Harbor provision in GOFA 
exempting issuers participating in multi-stakeholder initiatives 
from reporting separately on human rights due diligence.  The 
need for an established due diligence framework provided through 
multi-stakeholder initiatives is further underscored by the 
recognition of legislators involved in the drafting of Dodd-Frank 
and GOFA specialized corporate disclosure that the SEC will not 
be able to verify much of the due diligence methods used by 
companies on its own.84 
                                                     
82  See Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 6 (noting that the proposed rule 
was modified to include adherence to the established OECD framework); see also 
H.R. 491, 113th Cong. § 201 (1st Sess. 2013) (including a Safe Harbor provision 
exempting issuers participating in good standing with a multi-stakeholder 
initiative from the human rights due diligence reporting requirements). 
83  See Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 6, at 12 (discussing the new rule 
pursuant to Dodd-Frank Section 1502 relating to the use of conflict minerals). 
84  Telephone Interview with Shelly Han, Policy Advisor for Economics, 
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Greater involvement in multi-stakeholder initiatives is also 
important to the effective use of specialized corporate disclosure to 
change ICT company practices because it encourages cooperation 
between the various actors involved.  Cooperation among NGOs, 
investors, governments, companies, and other actors means more 
dialogue among stakeholders to “exchange feedback to develop 
operational approaches to address adverse human rights risks and 
impacts.”85  Unlike the “naming and shaming” approach, the 
exchange of ideas and increased dialogue between invested actors 
will give companies positive reinforcement and assist in the 
development of strategies that can be replicated in each country in 
which a company chooses to operate.  Cooperative and mutually 
beneficial relationships with other involved actors would prevent 
companies from withdrawing from certain markets for fear of bad 
publicity, and would instead empower them to put in place long-
term policy changes.  Michael Samway, former deputy general 
counsel of Yahoo!, recognized this benefit of participation in multi-
stakeholder initiatives in stating that “[f]orming institutional 
partnerships and developing relationships of trust in those 
stakeholder communities allows for confidential consultations and 
input invaluable to companies in mitigating risk and in creating 
value.”86  In this way, a cooperative grouping of stakeholders lends 
itself to ICT companies providing more reliable services to its 
consumers. The dialogue facilitated by multi-stakeholder 
initiatives thus better serves the objectives of specialized corporate 
disclosure for ICT companies. 
Finally, greater participation in multi-stakeholder initiatives 
would speed up the process of complying with disclosure 
requirements in GOFA.  Recalling the procedural implementation 
of the SEC final rule promulgated through Dodd-Frank, it could 
take many years before a finalized rule is passed containing the 
                                                     
Environment, Technology and Trade, Comm’n on Sec. & Cooperation in Eur. 
(Nov. 5, 2013). 
85  INT’L CORP. ACCT. ROUNDTABLE, “KNOWING AND SHOWING”: USING U.S. 
SECURITIES LAWS TO COMPEL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCLOSURE 24 (2013) [hereinafter 
“KNOWING AND SHOWING”] (discussing multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) 
developed to address concerns relating to human rights).  
86  Michael A. Samway, Business, Human Rights, and the Internet: A Framework 
for Implementation, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS 295 
(Mark P. Lagon & Anthony Clark Arend eds.,, 2014) [hereinafter Business and 
Human Rights] (discussing the role of corporations in assessing human rights risks 
that arise). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
KRISHNAMURTHY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015  5:06 PM 
842 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:3 
requirements outlined in GOFA.  Considering that GOFA itself has 
not yet been passed, the timeframe for implementation of 
disclosure requirements for ICT companies is indefinite.  
Companies that join or have already joined multi-stakeholder 
initiatives like the GNI will in the meantime be establishing a 
practice for conducting human rights due diligence without any 
legal duty being placed on them.  As noted by a lead congressional 
staffer involved in the drafting of GOFA, the hope among 
legislators supporting GOFA is that even before reporting 
requirements are elaborated, “Internet users and companies feel 
responsible for what is going on,” so that real progress can be 
made in changing industry practice.87  Multi-stakeholder initiatives 
serve the dual purpose of providing a framework for the reporting 
requirements in GOFA and reducing the compliance burden 
placed on companies.  
A second recommendation for more effective use of specialized 
corporate disclosure for ICT companies would be increasing 
shareholder and investor awareness on freedom of expression and 
privacy issues faced by the ICT sector.  Greater investor awareness 
would lead to more informed investment decisions that would 
utilize the information used in reporting to influence company 
decision making to make more socially conscious decisions.  The 
movement for Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) has 
spearheaded this concept, with the understanding that company 
decision making is still focused on the derived benefit of the 
shareholder and investor.  Thus, changing the considerations for 
corporate decision making “comes down to whether consumers 
want to use these products, and whether shareholders want to 
invest in these companies.”88  Changing the corporate calculus 
through investor activism has centered on the challenge of proving 
the materiality of human rights issues in corporate operations.89  
The standards outlined by the SEC and U.S. Supreme Court in 
determining whether a disclosure is material is ambiguous and 
flexible, but places emphasis on the “reasonable investor.”90  SRI 
                                                     
87  Telephone Interview with Shelly Han, supra note 84. 
88  Telephone Interview with Bennett Freeman, supra note 77. 
89  See “KNOWING AND SHOWING,” supra note 85, at 14 (“The second part of the 
disclosure process requires a subjective filtering of information related to required 
disclosure items through a screen of materiality, with the goal of ensuring that 
public disclosures are useful to investors and shareholders in assessing current 
and prospective corporate performance.”). 
90  Id. (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) 
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groups and NGOs have made efforts in support of both the conflict 
minerals and ICT reporting requirements to show that the reported 
information, though under the umbrella of human rights, is 
material to a growing number of investors.91  More shareholder 
awareness and activism efforts like these will change the 
expectations of the “reasonable investor” and will improve the 
leverage of socially responsible investors to change corporate 
decision making.  As summarized by Bennett Freeman, “the more 
we can demonstrate the materiality of the issues we raise, the more 
ground we will gain, both with the companies we are determined 
to influence and the investors we seek to attract.”92 
Greater shareholder and investor awareness will incentivize 
companies to focus on the long-term impact of their operations in 
other countries. The corporate response to negative media 
attention on human rights issues has typically been a “window-
dressing” strategy to create a temporary resolution to the problem 
without actually changing company practice in the long-term.93  
The real incentive to change long-term policy, however, will come 
from the marketplace.94  Changes in shareholder and investor 
decisions thus have more impact on a company’s reputation, 
because it goes directly to the heart of the company’s quantitative 
value.  Greater investor awareness and shareholder activism 
drawing upon the availability of reported information will be the 
push companies need to adopt significant changes that will be 
enforced in the long run.  In the context of the ICT sector, investors 
and NGOs pushing for responsible corporate policies in line with 
the GOFA reporting requirements recognize that “[s]tanding up 
against government censorship and surveillance requirements that 
are in clear violation of international human rights norms is an 
                                                     
for the proposition that “[a] fact is material if ‘there is a substantial likelihood that 
a reasonable investor would consider it important’ and would have viewed the 
information ‘as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.’”). 
91  See, e.g. Letter from SIF and ICCR, supra note 18 (discussing the investor 
materiality argument for conflict minerals disclosure requirements and 
commenting on SEC proposed rule). 
92  ICONS Interview Series: Rebecca Adamson of First Peoples Worldwide 
Interviews Bennett Freeman of Calvert Investments, GREEN MONEY J. (Spring 2013), 
http://www.greenmoneyjournal.com/spring-2013/icons/ [hereinafter ICONS 
Interview Series] (discussing corporate governance as one of Calvert’s top priorities 
for the year). 
93  Telephone Interview with Michael Samway, supra note 52. 
94  Telephone Interview with Shelly Han, supra note 84.  
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investment in the Internet’s long-term sustainability and long-term 
value.”95  In this way, increased investor awareness and advocacy 
can “contribute to . . . investment performance by challenging 
company directors and managements to focus on the long-term 
drivers of success.”96  
In addition to incentivizing companies to implement long-term 
change in policy, greater awareness and activism among 
shareholders will also lead to changes in practice industry-wide.  
Once the message has been sent to corporate management that 
human rights information required in SEC specialized corporate 
disclosure requirements is material to investors and an important 
part of their investment decisions, companies will be forced to 
change their practices or risk their market share.97  Therefore, 
investor activism and emphasis placed on socially responsible 
decision-making creates industry-wide competition and 
differentiates those companies who change their practices from 
those who do not.  A shift toward socially responsible investment 
will create a new set of expectations for companies, based on 
accountability and transparency.98  During the drafting of the final 
SEC rule on conflict minerals, a commentator argued that 
compliance with a final rule could put all corporate actors within 
the industry on a level playing field in terms of expectations.99  In 
order for this to occur, compliance with the reporting requirements 
must be combined with shareholder activism to change 
expectations of companies on the industry level. 
A third and final recommendation for the effective use of 
specialized corporate disclosure requirements to hold companies 
accountable for complicity in human rights abuses overseas is the 
need for more substantial internal initiatives within companies 
                                                     
95  See MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED, supra note 18, at 178 (noting 
how companies have been building corporate responsibility and sustainability 
strategies). 
96  See ICONS Interview Series, supra note 92 (discussing how shareholder 
advocacy and public policy engagement can contribute to Calvert’s investment 
performance).  
97  Telephone Interview with Bennett Freeman, supra note 77.  
98  See Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 6, at 8 (noting the suggestion of a 
commentator to the proposed rule that the final rule on reporting could prepare 
“companies to meet a new generation of expectations for greater supply chain 
transparency and accountability.”). 
99  See id. (“This commentator argued that such benefits could include 
eliminating any competitive disadvantage to companies already engaged in 
ensuring their conflict mineral purchases do not fund conflict in the DRC . . . .”). 
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themselves.  This internal mechanism should be based on a team of 
professionals employed by the company who are primarily 
responsible for looking into potential human rights challenges that 
may be faced each time a company takes an action outside of the 
United States.  The team should be a permanent fixture in the 
company and should consist of senior-level operational support.100  
Most importantly, the internal structure should involve legal 
analysis of relevant laws in theory and practice, and how these 
laws as they currently exist will impact a company’s operations. 
The analysis would not simply be based on an effective public 
relations or marketing strategy; thus allowing companies to 
implement strategies to understand the human rights issues 
beyond the regulatory framework of each country in which they 
operate.101  It has been argued that a major flaw with “corporate 
social responsibility” departments that exist in almost every major 
company today is their failure to incorporate the various human 
rights challenges encountered by their business into the company’s 
day-to-day operations.102  An initiative particular to business and 
human rights would therefore be one that specifically addresses 
legal frameworks in other countries and how they impact a 
company’s work.  Employing a business and human rights 
program, like that developed by Yahoo! and described in this 
paper, should be done separate from the corporate social 
responsibility objectives involving public relations and marketing.  
According to Michael Samway, this differentiation helps to prevent 
efforts from being diminished by the perception “that those 
corporate functions have less input and decision-making authority 
on critical legal, regulatory, and policy decisions.”103 
Internal initiatives will also provide a framework that can be 
applied with modification to each country or situation in which 
companies face human rights challenges.  Similar to the argument 
                                                     
100  See Business and Human Rights, supra note 86, at 304 (arguing that “relying 
on regular board decisions is less effective than positioning that responsibility in 
the hands of a dedicated team that has executive officer input and support and the 
ability to act with sufficient speed, understanding, and resources.”). 
101  Telephone Interview with Michael Samway, supra note 52.  
102  See Business and Human Rights, supra note 86, at 299–300 (arguing that the 
corporate social responsibility approach has not kept up with the new challenges 
faced by potential human rights abuses in foreign jurisdictions that come as a 
direct result of a company’s products or services, with particular reference to the 
ICT sector). 
103  Id. at 305. 
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previously made regarding the benefits of participation in multi-
stakeholder initiatives, internal initiatives on business and human 
rights would allow companies to develop and implement a 
standardized set of practices with regard to tackling human rights 
issues in their operations.  The difference here, obviously, is that 
the framework would largely come from within as opposed to 
being significantly informed by NGO and investor members of a 
multi-stakeholder group.  Both approaches serve the important 
function of organizing the policies and procedures necessary to 
embed the practice of addressing human rights into the company 
itself, an approach supported by internationally agreed-upon 
principles of the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights.104  It is important for companies to establish their own 
internal mechanisms by which they carry out due diligence and 
address human rights in their business so they can adequately 
prepare themselves to comply with reporting requirements while 
also catering their efforts to the unique identity of their company.  
It is certain to take a significant amount of time before any rule for 
ICT companies is implemented (if it becomes law at all), but if 
companies take steps and modify their practices with reporting in 
mind they will be better prepared to comply with reporting 
requirements if they are made into law.  Aside from the demands 
of potential reporting requirements, an established commitment 
and protocol dedicated to business and human rights developed 
internally will also allow “more advanced planning and 
thoughtfulness in crisis anticipation, resolution, and avoidance.”105 
An example of an internal initiative within the business and 
human rights framework in the ICT sector is that of Yahoo!’s 
Human Rights Impact Assessment (“HRIA”) in Vietnam, which 
was created in the wake of the reputational damage to the 
company caused by the Shi Tao incident in China.  Yahoo! has 
publicly committed to carrying out HRIAs to investigate human 
rights and rule of law in countries in which they operate.106  These 
assessments are used to decide whether to operate within a given 
                                                     
104  See JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 113 (Kwame Anthony Appiah ed., 2013) (“An explicit policy 
commitment is necessary in order to embed the responsibility to respect human 
rights within a company.”).  
105 Business and Human Rights, supra note 86, at 305. 
106  Human Rights Impact Assessments, YAHOO! BUS. & HUM. RTS. PROGRAM, 
http://www.yhumanrightsblog.com/blog/our-initiatives/human-rights-impact-
assessments/. 
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country.107  Additionally, HRIAs could be used to decide whether 
to develop a strategic plan to designate potential human rights 
risks and devise strategies to deal with those risks should they 
arise in the course of operation. The company considers a number 
of factors when completing an HRIA that allow it to assess the 
human rights impacts of entering a new market or introducing a 
new product.108  Yahoo! completed an internally driven HRIA in 
Vietnam before deciding whether to offer country-specific services 
to Vietnamese users.109  In carrying out the assessment, Yahoo! 
sought to look beyond the regulatory framework of a country 
codified in law and communicated with relevant actors on the 
ground to determine how the framework was applied in 
practice.110  Based on the information obtained in its HRIA, Yahoo! 
determined that Vietnam’s restrictive practices toward Vietnamese 
bloggers posed a threat to the company’s ability to be able to 
uphold rights to freedom of expression and privacy to their users if 
they were to operate within the country.111  As a result, it decided 
to instead set up Vietnamese-language operations in Singapore, 
where less risk existed.112  
Yahoo!’s HRIA initiative in Vietnam represents another benefit 
of internal company initiatives that could supplement the use of 
specialized corporate disclosure to change industry practice.  
Yahoo!’s HRIA is particularly important to note because it was a 
preventative measure used to measure the risk environment with 
regard to human rights if Yahoo! were to open up operations in 
Vietnam.  These types of internal company initiatives are 
consistent with the goals of the proposed GOFA requirements 
because they provide a means by which companies can avoid 
                                                     
107  Id. 
108  See id. (listing the relevant factors considered in conducting HRIAs, 
including: “international legal and moral foundations for the rights to freedom of 
expression and privacy”; “[t]he general human rights landscape in the relevant 
country or region, with a particular focus on rule of law, free expression and 
privacy”; “local laws about free expression and privacy”; “Yahoo!’s business and 
product plans for entry into the market”; “[t]he existing and potential benefits of 
the Internet to the citizens of the relevant region or country”; “[r]isk scenarios 
based on Yahoo!’s products and operations”; “recommendations to avoid or 
mitigate those risks”; and “[recommendations] to protect and promote free 
expression and privacy [in the relevant region or country].”). 
109  Telephone Interview with Michael Samway, supra note 52. 
110  Id. 
111  MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED, supra note 18, at 181. 
112  Id. 
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future complications by applying due diligence measures prior to 
entering new markets.  If companies like Yahoo! are able to 
determine beforehand whether the risks are too great to enter a 
market, it could avoid discovering unfavorable information later 
on if and when corporate disclosure is required.  Consequently, 
with the proposed GOFA reporting requirements and greater SRI 
interest in mind, it is a smart business decision for companies to 
take preventative measures to ensure they will not be negatively 
impacted further down the line.  Even without mandated 
disclosure, companies still have a strong incentive to employ 
preventative practices because those companies that have already 
begun to implement such programs have a competitive advantage 
where providing similar products.  The preventative approach is 
not only practical but also in line with multi-stakeholder initiatives 
and recognized international models for business and human 
rights that are becoming increasingly popular and are cited with 
growing frequency among lawmakers.113 
Specialized corporate disclosure is an important and growing 
mechanism by which U.S. companies operating in the context of 
weak human rights regimes can be held accountable for their 
actions abroad.  The experience and major criticisms of the 
specialized corporate disclosure requirements enforced regarding 
conflict minerals can inform us of the prospects for other potential 
specialized corporate disclosure initiatives, including the human 
rights due diligence requirement in Section 201 of the Global 
Online Freedom Act.  Based on a comparison of both rules and the 
industries that would fall under their purview, the major barriers 
to implementation of the specialized corporate disclosure approach 
as it stands are:  transparency achieved through reporting is only 
the first step of the accountability mechanism; the danger that 
“naming and shaming” could antagonize companies to carry out 
less-than-ideal solutions to avoid public shaming; and the 
                                                     
113  See GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES FOR THE 
PRINCIPLES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRIVACY 2 (2012) (stating that 
participants should use HRIAs to “identify circumstances when freedom of 
expression and privacy may be jeopardized or advanced, and develop 
appropriate risk mitigation strategies . . .” including when “[e]ntering new 
markets, particularly those where freedom of expression and privacy are not well 
protected.”); see also RUGGIE, supra note 104, at 112–13 (explaining that the 
corporate responsibility to respect enshrined in the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights requires that companies assess 
potential human rights impacts and address potential adverse impacts through 
prevention and mitigation). 
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corporate decision making calculus is still focused on profit 
maximization and shareholder benefit. Despite these obstacles, 
specialized corporate disclosure can still be used as an effective 
means of holding companies accountable for human rights impacts 
overseas and to change industry practice to be more in line with 
concerns of business and human rights, but it must be part of a 
coordinated approach involving all affected actors.  To that end, it 
is recommended that there be greater company participation in 
multi-stakeholder initiatives aimed at implementing business and 
human rights strategies in ICT companies, greater investor 
awareness and shareholder activism at work to use information 
published to change company decision making, and greater 
internal initiatives within the companies themselves to bolster the 
company’s commitment to human rights.  
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